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ABSTRACT  In fall 2001, over 200 digital television channels were launched in Canada. One
of those channels was WTSN (Women’s Television Sports Network)—the world’s first 24-
hour television network exclusively dedicated to broadcasting women’s sports. In the fall of
2003, however, WTSN ceased broadcasting operations. This analysis of CRTC policies and
personal interview data with Canadian media members argues that while the demise of
WTSN can be attributed to the unfortunate pitfalls associated with early digital television
rollout and cultural policies, the network’s downfall is best explained in substantially more
ideological terms. From the outset, WTSN entered uncharted waters in the Canadian televi-
sion sport landscape, attempting to showcase women’s sports to a predominantly female
audience—a demographic that has yet to materialize for mainstream sports programming.
KEywORDS Broadcasting policy; Cable systems; Gender and media; Sports programming;
Digital television 
RéSUMé En automne 2001 au Canada a lieu la lancée de plus de 200 chaînes de télévision
numériques. Une de ces chaînes est WTSN (Women’s Television Sports Network), le premier
réseau de télévision au monde entièrement dédié à la diffusion des sports féminins 24 heures
sur 24. WTSN, cependant, disparaît des ondes dès l’automne 2003. Cette analyse des
politiques du CRTC et d’entrevues menées par l’auteur auprès de professionnels des médias
canadiens soutient que, bien qu’on puisse attribuer l’échec de WTSN à certaines politiques
culturelles ainsi qu’aux problèmes reliés à l’expansion trop hâtive de la télévision numérique
à l’époque, on peut aussi tirer avantage d’une approche plus idéologique pour expliquer la
disparition de ce réseau. En effet, en offrant les sports pour femmes à un public composé
majoritairement de femmes, WTSN dès ses débuts s’est aventuré dans un territoire inconnu
par l’univers des sports sur les ondes canadiennes, la majorité des femmes n’ayant pas encore
montré un intérêt soutenu pour la programmation sportive à grand public.
MOTS CléS Politique de radiodiffusion; Systèmes de câblodistribution; Sexe et médias;
Programmation sportive; Télévision numérique
This article explores the birth and demise of the Canadian digital specialty televi-sion channel wTSN (women’s Television Sports Network). launched in
September 2001 alongside an assortment of other digital channels, wTSN was the first
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of its kind in the world, exclusively dedicated to broadcasting women’s sports pro-
gramming 24 hours a day. From the beginning, wTSN and other digital channels were
touted by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission
(CRTC) as rich sites of diverse programming that would, among other things, invigor-
ate and advance the distribution and consumption of digital technology in Canada.
The CRTC’s decision to launch these digital channels was also based on the assump-
tion that the distribution of digital technology would be financially profitable. In the
case of wTSN, however, September 30, 2003, marked its final day of broadcast opera-
tions—this after only two years. Canadian Television Inc. (CTV) president Rick Brace
explained that “[a] combination of lower-than expected growth and limited access to
advertising revenue led to [the] unfortunate decision, along with the high cost of run-
ning a sports service” (quoted in Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE), August 29, 2003). As
this comment illustrates, CTV Inc. framed the suspension of wTSN’s operations as
a decision based on financial feasibility more than other mitigating factors.
Following the model of Robert Sparks’ (1992) study of The Sport Network’s (TSN)
birth as a satellite-to-cable network service, this examination of wTSN attempts to
demonstrate how two other major factors also explain the digital network’s short-
lived existence. First, the regulatory policy context in which digital television came
into being in Canada provides insight into the circumstances surrounding wTSN’s cre-
ation. Debate over the implementation of digital television in Canada can be traced
back to CRTC documents of the mid- to late 1990s. As Canada’s regulatory body, the
agency has been both applauded for offering the Canadian consumer market new
technologies and services (through awarding broadcasting licences to deserving appli-
cants) and criticized for imposing unrealistic regulations and restrictions on new serv-
ices (which generally reduce broadcasters’ chances of commercial success and
long-term viability) (see Christie, 2003; Killingsworth, 2005; see Raboy, 1990). The
implementation of digital television was no exception. For instance, at the time of dig-
ital TV’s rollout, some media observers argued that the Canadian consumer market
had yet to show strong interest in digital television technology (see Blackwell, 2003;
Vikhman, 2002; Zelkovich, 2002). This lack of interest, coupled with the
September 2001 arrival of over 200 digital television channels, added to the challenge
of building consumer awareness of the new technology.1
The second factor that this study considers is the ever-evolving nature of the audi-
ence. The audience commodity, a  concept introduced through the work of Dallas
Smythe (1977), helps impart an understanding of how wTSN’s creators may have
envisioned the network’s ideal viewer and hence advertiser. For wTSN, securing
a lucrative audience commodity was arguably the most important factor in surviving
on the then obscure digital television platform. However, although the audience com-
modity is important to understanding how content is tailored for certain demograph-
ics, and how these demographics are sold to advertisers, it falls short in providing
a sharper picture of modern audiences that access media content via digital means.
Recent accounts and scholarship on the nature of modern media communication
have emphasized the need to consider the role of audience interactivity in the relation-
ship between content production, dissemination, promotion, reception, and feedback
(Berry, 2006; Cover, 2006). Generally speaking, audience interactivity accounts for not
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only the ability of audiences to exercise choice in how media content may be con-
sumed but also their capacity to participate in the re-fashioning of content and mes-
sages through feedback (Baltruschat, 2009; Cover, 2006; Holmes, 2004). As Cover
(2006, p. 141) states, the concept accounts for “some element of user control over nar-
rative content in a media or new media text.”
Although the regulatory environment presented obstacles for wTSN, alternative
explanatory frames also demonstrate how the network’s envisioned target audience
may have predetermined its demise from the start. I argue that the failure of wTSN
was both ideological and gendered, for the network’s largest flaw was that its audience
commodity was founded on an inherent gender bias. wTSN’s objective was to show-
case female sports, to predominantly female audiences, in a television sport market-
place saturated with male sports, catering to predominantly male audiences. This
analysis provides substantial evidence that in its attempt to reach its objective, wTSN
encountered an unsympathetic television sport climate where the cultural standard
and very definition of “real” sport was analogous to male sport.
Overall, this examination of the wTSN case employs three qualitative methods.
The first is a brief tracing of the evolution and regulatory history of digital television
in Canada. Second, the article provides a historical profile of wTSN, including its own-
ership, programming, intended audience, and financial record. Finally, the findings
from 12 interviews conducted from 2004 to 2005 with both female and male Canadian
media workers offer practical insight. These interviews addressed, among other topics,
the political economy of digital television in Canada, the media representation of
sport culture, and the fate of wTSN.2 The experiences and knowledge shared by these
individuals are indicative of an industry response to digital television in general and
Canadian sport media in particular. Their knowledge of Canadian media and televi-
sion sport is invaluable in considering not only some of wTSN’s dilemmas but also
how experts in the field of media sport in Canada envisioned the network’s arrival in
the milieu of regular reporting routines and everyday sports coverage.
Television as nation-building: A brief history of early 
television and cable 
Television’s role in bringing Canadians together and fostering national identity can be
described as one firmly rooted in the ideologies of technological nationalism (Babe,
1990)—a perspective that upholds communications technology as the backbone of
nation-building. Historically (and, arguably, currently) the character of this nation-
building can be classified as both protectionist and reactionary. For instance, in the
late 1940s, concerns over the developed and well-established American television
broadcasting system pressured the Canadian government to act in order to preserve
and shelter Canadian culture from impending U.S. domination. Much like its prede-
cessor radio, public television was entrusted with bridging the gaps between geograph-
ically and regionally fragmented communities as well as providing a  distinct
alternative to readily available American television signals that were accessible to
some 30,000 Canadian households owning television sets in 1950 (Cavanaugh, 1992).
These households easily picked up American television signals via antennae, and the
efforts of upstart entrepreneurs keen to experiment with available resources and infra-
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structure drove early penetration (Canadian Communications Foundation, 2009).
Already mandated by the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act of 1932 to serve the vast
geographic regions of the country via an integrated national radio network in both
English and French, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) was assigned the
duty of extending its public service to television broadcasting. This effectively solidi-
fied its responsibility to showcase and reflect Canadian culture to Canadians and pro-
moted television as the bearer of national unity (Jackson, 2001).
Television sports programming also figures prominently in the pursuit of
Canadian nation-building. American broadcaster signals with ample sports program-
ming were readily available to many Canadians by the early 1950s, and amateur sports,
NHl hockey, and significant international events like the 1954 Commonwealth Games
figured prominently into the CBC’s broadcast schedule, as they served the purposes
of delivering Canadian content and fostering broader government initiatives for ama-
teur sport development (Cavanaugh, 1992; Scherer & whitson, 2009). By the late
1950s, as a public broadcaster the CBC was deeply entrenched in sports programming.
By 1961, however, the public broadcaster was no longer the only television network
broadcasting sport to a national audience. Although sport remained a dominant fea-
ture of CBC programming, the licensing of the privately owned CTV changed the
broadcasting landscape. CTV represented competition for the existing CBC network
and offered audiences both popular Canadian (e.g., CFl football) and American sports
programming (e.g., Wide World of Sports) (Cavanaugh, 1992). 
The 1960s and ’70s proved to be watershed decades for the advancement of
Canadian cable services. This phenomenon was fuelled by two factors. First, the
Canadian audience was becoming fragmented as households (primarily concentrated
in urban areas) that had access to American TV signals prior to the arrival of CBC and
CTV television services were less attracted to these Canadian broadcasters and demon-
strated this by subscribing to cable services that offered better channel variety (Sparks,
1992). Second, the Canadian government recognized that if left unregulated, such
cable services would threaten the Canadian broadcasting system that it had purposely
endeavoured to cultivate and protect. In 1968, when the CRTC was created as a regu-
latory body, it was formally mandated through the authority of the newly revised
Broadcasting Act to oversee the licensing of broadcasting services. At this time, cable
operations were “reined in” and the definition of the broadcasting system in Canada
was amended to include cable television. In the early 1970s, the foundations for satel-
lite-to-cable undertakings were set in place as Telesat Canada launched the world’s
first domestic satellite communications service (lorimer & Gasher, 2004), creating
a new and expansive platform for potential cable delivery. From 1967 to 1980, the
number of Canadian households subscribing to cable television services grew from
517,000 to 4.3 million (Hall & Jowett, 2001).
Against all odds: The arrival of digital television in Canada
Channels offering exclusive genres of programming have been a part of Canadian
broadcasting since “narrowcasters” like TSN and MuchMusic debuted in 1984, target-
ing fragmented segments of the general audience. By the mid-1990s, however, the abil-
ity to win the popularity and patronage of Canadian cable television consumers
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steadily increased, to a point where as narrowcasters, TSN and MuchMusic had suc-
cessfully lured substantial portions of the audience from conventional (over-the-air)
broadcasters (see Ashley, 1986; Davis, 1989). This phenomenon had been aided in
1989 when both TSN and MuchMusic gained access to the analogue cable system as
discretionary services that could be purchased in addition to basic cable
(Killingsworth, 2005). with this access, the two narrowcasters effectively secured guar-
anteed cable and specialty service revenues. Their evolution from stand-alone discre-
tionary services, in hindsight, would place them in a different realm than their future
digital specialty counterparts launched 17 years later. 
In a 2000 news release, the CRTC announced that it had decided to introduce the
digital television platform because it was “convinced that these high quality and var-
ied services [would] help drive the penetration of digital technology in Canada and
provide new windows for Canadian talent while offering Canadian viewers a wide
array of new choices” (CRTC, 2000a, p. 1). These idealistic sentiments echoed those
employed by the Commission in its decision to introduce Canada’s first specialty chan-
nels in 1984—MuchMusic and TSN (Sparks, 1992). Then, however, the two speciality
channels arguably were not genre competitors, nor were they facing strong competi-
tion from other specialty channels.
The cultural imperative was another force behind the Commission’s decision to
expand the cable delivery platform. Besides expanding the delivery platform for tele-
vision, the CRTC believed that digital channels would provide a diverse range of con-
tent that would not only reflect and cater to various cultural interests but also appeal
to customers. It reasoned that “the most attractive aspect” of this “wide array of new
choices” was that customers would be “in the driver’s seat” when determining which
services they wanted to pay for (CRTC, 2000a, pp. 1-3). Two policy documents frame
the regulatory context for the development and implementation of digital television
in Canada: a report published by the Task Force on the Implementation of Digital
Television in 1997 and a  Standing Committee report from the Department of
Canadian Heritage in 2003.
Canadian television in the digital era: The report of the Task Force 
on the Implementation of Digital Television
The primary focus of the Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television’s
(TFIDTV) 1997 report was to recommend practical strategies for bringing digital tele-
vision technology to Canadian consumers. Despite this, its membership did not
include regular cable television customers. The TFIDTV’s members did include tech-
nology manufacturers, established broadcasters, various players in the Canadian
film/television production community, and academic observers. Ambiguous evi-
dence of the TFIDTV’s consultation with would-be consumers is limited to a brief
paragraph in its report stating that recommendations were drawn from dialogue with
“working groups” (TFIDTV, 1997, p. 6).
The task force report cited the potential technological prowess of a digital televi-
sion distribution system. Two additional forces were behind the TFIDTV’s evaluation of
Canada’s need to move the mode of television broadcasting forward. The first was an
implicitly framed threat of the then already established and operating U.S. digital tele-
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vision system. The TFIDTV argued that Canada could not afford to repeat the disaster
of the DTH (direct-to-home) satellite grey market, where Canadian households resid-
ing outside “official” American service boundaries were able to access and pay for U.S.
satellite cable television by means of routing bills to U.S. postbox numbers. The second
motive for implementing digital television concerned the technology’s “endless
growth” potential. The TFIDTV believed that an upgraded and modern digital platform
would place Canada at the top of television production with its European, U.S., and
South American counterparts. Such a move would also ensure a strong global techno-
logical compatibility, which meant that an appropriate mechanism would be in place
for the trade and purchase of cross-cultural and international media products.
The strategic framework proposed by the TFIDTV consisted of nine recommen-
dations outlining how the transition from the analogue to digital television platform
should be enacted, and eight others that explicitly outlined the steps required for final
implementation. Two paternalistic highlights of the report concerned the recommen-
dation that the CRTC take steps toward totally phasing out analogue television trans-
mission by the end of 2007 and a  suggestion that the federal government adopt
a permanent $200-million per annum funding allotment for the Canadian Television
and Cable Production Fund, which would increase by $50 million per annum from
1997 to 2007 (TFIDTV, 1997).
Notwithstanding its seven other recommendations for how the CRTC could
address digital implementation, the TFIDTV stated that “[f]ailure to move with speed
and precision in [implementing a permanent fund would] jeopardize the whole tran-
sition process, with concomitant negative effects on the broadcasting system and
[Canada’s] domestic and international cultural and economic objectives” (TFIDTV,
1997, p. 29). These two recommendations foreshadowed the tone taken by the task
force in its remaining outline of steps necessary for digital implementation.
Recommendations 10 to 17 explicitly called for heavy CRTC involvement in the cre-
ation, regulation, and monitoring of digital television undertakings. In all, while the
TFIDTV admirably outlined practical approaches to ensuring reasonable penetration
of digital television by 2007, it left the task of determining market conditions and need
largely in the hands of the CRTC.
Our cultural sovereignty: The second century of broadcasting in Canada
In 2003 the Standing Committee on Cultural Heritage (SCCH) published an extensive
report outlining the successes, failures, and current state of affairs of public/private
radio, television, and Internet communication in Canada. Of particular interest are
chapters 4 and 12, which detail the state of the audience and make recommendations
for a smooth transition into the digital era. Analytically, it is logical to discuss the par-
ticular implications of chapter 12 first; chapter 4, which complements a discussion of
the audience commodity, will be discussed in further detail after.
Chapter 12 of the SCCH report, entitled “The Digital Transition,” begins by
acknowledging that the digital revolution will be faced with various challenges, which
include marketing to new audiences and striking a fair balance between entertaining
audiences and adhering to the regulations of the Broadcasting Act. The committee
was informed by various stakeholders.3 Each stakeholder expressed their respective
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concerns regarding the implementation of digital technology, with particular atten-
tion paid to content issues, the acquisition of appropriate production equipment, and
economic viability. Specifically, these groups were concerned with three issues: 1) how
the transition from analogue to digital transmission would affect audience retention;
2) how digital television would be “phased in”; and 3) how pay and specialty services
would be packaged for consumers (SCCH, 2003, p. 432). 
Clearly, the SCCH organized much of its study of the digital transition around the
audience, yet framed it more as a taken-for-granted afterthought rather than as a fun-
damental part of and powerful player in a successful digital transition. Although the
sentiments of stakeholders in this chapter speak to the practical limitations faced by
service providers and, indirectly, shareholders, little evidence is given that everyday con-
sumers were consulted as part of this process of assessing market capacity and need.
Implicitly, the SCCH identified consumers as playing a significant role in ensuring mar-
ket penetration and abiding by copyright laws, et cetera, but actual consumer input and
formal address to the committee is not present in the report, notwithstanding a hand-
ful of organizations and groups that identified themselves as consumer advocates.
From audience commodity to audience interactivity 
In its most basic form, the audience commodity is the product of “mass-produced,
advertiser-supported communications,” argues Smythe (1977, p. 3). The content of for-
profit or commercial mass media, in this regard, does not solely produce meanings,
messages, and entertainment, but markets from which potential audiences are drawn
and then sold to advertisers. Smythe (1977, p. 4) adds that when considered as “collec-
tivities,” audiences perform as commodities with specific demographics, such as age,
sex, social class, marital status, ethnicity, hobby interests, et cetera. This unique rela-
tionship between mass media producers and advertisers is of course highly depend-
ent on the type of programming that audiences choose to watch and the given
demographic qualities embodied by its members. 
The audience commodity is a significant factor to consider in the story of wTSN
for two reasons. First, traditional television sports programming has predominantly
targeted an 18- to 40-year-old male demographic mainly interested in watching sports
where males are the primary participants (Duncan & Messner, 1998). As the predom-
inant target market for television sports programming, the male audience is valuable
not only because of its ability to reach a broad-ranging age demographic but also
because the historical development of television sport occurred in an era where males
were targeted as primary household financial decision-makers (Jhally, 1982). For
wTSN, pinpointing a female audience pool that would be attractive to potential adver-
tisers was the paramount challenge, because females have not historically figured
prominently into the psychographic profile of television sport demographics
(Messner, Dunbar, & Hunt, 2000). Though financial independence and socio-eco-
nomic security are increasing for Canadian women, there remains a significant gender
income gap that favours males by 21% (Conference Board of Canada, 2009). This fac-
tor is noteworthy in the grand scheme of the audience commodity for women’s sports
programming, because if female audiences are conceived as the ideal viewers, the
potential returns for advertisers would be lower than those gained from males.
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with the simultaneous launch of seven other sport digital channels in 2001
(including ESPN Classic Canada, Fox Sports world Canada, leafs  TV, the NHl
Network, the Racing Network, Raptors NBA TV, and X-Treme Sports), Canadian tele-
vision itself was entering uncharted waters. At first glance, securing an audience for
those other channels might have been an easier task than the one faced by an all-
women’s sports channel. Simply put, these channels supplemented an established
genre of sport television programming (i.e., NHl hockey, NBA basketball, professional
European football, and rugby) that wTSN did not. wTSN could in fact be considered
a radical departure from what traditional television sports programming offered.
Because of this, the network would also have to address its potential audience in a rad-
ically different way than its predecessors and competitors. 
The second reason why the audience commodity is an important factor to con-
sider in the story of wTSN rests in chapter 4 of Our Cultural Sovereignty, wherein the
SCCH compiles ratings and survey data on English- and French-language television
viewing on conventional, pay, and speciality broadcasters from 1993 to 2001. The chap-
ter’s general thrust is that Canadian audiences are fragmented along technology and
genre lines where viewing of a variety of programming on conventional broadcasters
remains high, but such broadcasters face stiff competition from pay and specialty net-
works that target specific programming genres. For instance, in 2001 audience shares
for English-language conventional broadcasters totalled 53% (i.e., CBC and CTV) and
46.9% for pay and specialty services (SCCH, 2003). Importantly, the 2001 numbers
also show that CTV/Bell Globemedia Inc. (owner of wTSN) held 18.4% of total audi-
ence share—the highest of all ownership groups for English television in Canada
(SCCH, 2003). when viewing of television sport is taken into account, Canadian pay
and specialty broadcasters garnered 46.9% of all viewing while the CBC came in
a close second, at 42.2%. This factor is significant due to the fact that as a new digital
specialty channel, wTSN entered a market that demonstrated a desire to view sports.
what remained to be seen at the time of the network’s inception was whether or not
this factor necessarily meant there was room for another specialty sport broadcaster,
solely dedicated to women’s sport.
As it happens, wTSN was not unique in failing to attract a profitable audience
commodity. Poor ratings also haunted EdgeTV (an alternative music network) and
PrideVision (a gay and lesbian affairs and entertainment network), two other digital
channels launched at the same time (see Jonhston, 2005). Still, wTSN can be consid-
ered unique when compared to other digital offerings launched by CTV Specialty TV
Inc. in 2001 and beyond because it was the only sport channel that did not survive. Its
failure also calls attention to the challenges that traditional media companies have
been forced to negotiate in the era of mobile media and increasing interactivity. The
failure of wTSN also illustrates that the arcane or underrepresented subject can no
longer suffice as the only rationale for attracting audiences. 
Discussions of the values of audience interactivity such as user choice and con-
trol, which are less applicable to non-digitized texts, have appeared in the pages of
numerous trade publications. These discussions have observed that potentially new
and lucrative revenue streams provided by the Internet and other mobile technologies
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are the new focus of many traditional media companies invested in making the tran-
sition into the digital age a successful one (see Anonymous, 2009; Bugailiskis, 2005;
Gerlsbeck, 2007; Rickwood, 2009; Semansky, 2008). This emerging trend has been
cited and embraced by sports networks like The Score—a network that transformed
from satellite-to-cable delivery to digital transmission. when re-vamping its television
broadcasting headquarters, the network emphasized the concept of interactivity and
bragged that its brand of sports programming would allow “hardcore fans” to feel as
if they were “hanging out at a high-tech water cooler” (Anonymous, 2008, p. 20). 
Digital licensee framework: A regulatory history
Out of over 450 applications for digital television specialty services, the CRTC
approved licences for 283, releasing the details of its decision in November 2000 (see
CRTC, 2000b). Category 1 services were classified as those making the strongest con-
tribution to diversity in television programming and were granted automatic access to
digital service carriers and distributors. Category 2 services were those that could not
compete with existing pay/specialty or category 1 channels and were not granted auto-
matic access to digital service providers—instead, they would have to negotiate access
with service carriers.
wTSN was granted a  category  1 licence and was required to launch before
November 24, 2001. Since all digital service providers were required to carry every cat-
egory 1 channel, wTSN benefited from being packaged with other digital networks
(diginets – an amalgamation of ‘digital’ and ‘network’) for initial distribution. This
opportunity was not afforded to category 2 channels. These channels were required to
launch no later than November 24, 2003, and their requirement to negotiate with serv-
ice carriers was to guarantee category 1 licensees some genre protection by providing
an artificial “head start” in the market. Another notable criterion on which licences
were secured was Canadian content. By the end of the six-year licence term, Canadian
programming was to represent 50% of all programming content for category 1 services
(CRTC, 2000b).
Interestingly, category 2 licences were regulated by less restrictive selection crite-
ria. During their six-year licence agreement, no Canadian content (Cancon) restric-
tions were imposed on category 2 channels (see CRTC, 2000b). At first glance, it could
be argued that category 2 licences would be more restrictive because of the decreased
likelihood of creating a digital service, unlike existing category 1 and pay/specialty
offerings. However, even though category 2 licensees like the Racing Network were
not guaranteed carriage by digital television distributors, their chances of survival
might have been greater than category 1 licensees because of the absence of Cancon
regulations (Christie, 2003). without the burden of producing Canadian content, cat-
egory 2 networks could spend substantially less on programming production. For cat-
egory  2 networks, purchasing pre-recorded programming (e.g., from U.S. or other
foreign networks) or re-broadcasting events already produced by conventional net-
works constituted the bulk of programming expenses.
Not surprisingly, the ownership structures that backed the digital offerings were
pre-established, successful media players in the Canadian marketplace. In fact, out of
the 20 channels launched alongside wTSN, four other licensees came from compa-
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nies and holdings held under the same BCE conglomerate banner. Five other digital
undertakings were owned by a variety of corporate configurations, including Rogers,
Shaw, and Canwest Global. 
Ambitious beginnings: WTSN in profile
Ownership
From 2001 to the end of its broadcasting run, wTSN was owned by CTV  Specialty
Television Inc. wTSN and its broadcast sibling TSN were operated under the banner of
CTV Specialty Television Inc. (a division within Bell Globemedia Inc.), which was owned
by the Canadian conglomerate BCE. At the time of wTSN’s demise, CTV Specialty was
responsible for operating other exclusive sports specialty channels, including TSN, its
French-language counterpart RDS (Reseau de  Sports), and OlN (the Outdoor life
Network—specializing in sport, recreation, and leisure lifestyles). Other non-sport spe-
cialty services operated by CTV Specialty included CTV Newsnet (a 24-hour news serv-
ice), the Comedy Network, and ROBTv (Report on Business Tv—a  business news
service, now renamed Business News Network (BNN)). The size and number of these
holdings is indicative of what some respondents referred to as Bell Globemedia’s “deep
pockets.” As Bell Globemedia was an established leader in specialty sport services, most
of this study’s respondents suggested that a major reason why Bell Globemedia intro-
duced wTSN was because it could afford to take the financial risk:
TSN has been incredibly successful—probably of all the cable stations out
there. It’s been in existence now for 20 years. But it’s just been a cash box. So,
they might have thought that it was worth the gamble. … To them, it was
probably just a drop in the bucket. (Respondent 10, male reporter)
They have access to print reporters. They have access to TSN. They have
access to their main CTV network. And they have access to Bell as a spon-
sor  … as the mother company or whatever. I think they’ve proven that
they’re willing to take some risk. (Respondent 6, female host/commentator)
As evidenced in the above reflections, CTV’s (Bell Globemedia) backing went beyond
financial clout. with Bell Globemedia’s access to other sport speciality channels, many
respondents reasoned that if wTSN’s owners were not able to purchase programming
and events, existing synergies would allow for the purchase of women’s sporting
events already broadcast on sibling networks.
Programming
In its decision to grant a category 1 digital broadcasting licence to wTSN, the CRTC
claimed that the shared synergies with the network’s lineage of experienced and suc-
cessful specialty broadcasters would be a particular strength (CRTC, 2000c).
Respondents had mixed feelings about this claim. while wTSN’s broadcasting lineage
was undoubtedly experienced in sports programming, an all-women’s sports format
did not necessarily fit the mould of its predecessors. when asked to name the top rev-
enue producing television sports, respondents placed NHl hockey, Major league
Baseball, NFl football, and CFl football (all professional men’s sports) at the top of
their lists. These sports were also thought to be popular with audiences and already
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extensively covered by existing Canadian channels. while women’s tennis, hockey,
and golf were identified as making modest gains in revenues and viewership in recent
history, respondents repeatedly noted that these sports tend to experience sharp
spikes in appeal, a pattern that does not generally translate into year-round financial
sustainability for sports programming. Not one women’s sport was deemed a long-
standing, revenue-rich source of programming with a guaranteed audience. One
respondent commented:
As far as I know, there is no women’s sport that makes money. women’s
sports tend to be put in the same category as amateur sports. I wouldn’t say
public service. But it is almost done more for altruistic reasons. I would think
women’s tennis makes good money in Canada because again, you don’t have
to produce it. And it does fairly well. It’s not hockey, or football, or baseball
numbers, but it’s better than basketball, for example. (Respondent 4, male
reporter)
The above comment speaks to what some respondents identified as a  disconnect
between the realities of running an all-women’s sport service and the availability of
women’s sport event programming to broadcast. Here, the case of TSN is instructive.
Killingsworth (1999, 2005) and Sparks (1992) have documented that most of TSN’s
early success as a specialty sport service was attributed to a combination of factors—
three of which are particularly significant. First, Canadian brewer John labatt ltd. was
TSN’s original owner. This relationship provided the network with enough financial
power to purchase lucrative television broadcasting rights for major sporting events.
It also forged a steadfast relationship between TSN’s audience—mainly males 18 to
49 years old—and beer (Sparks, 1992). Second, during this time, labatt also owned
the Toronto Blue Jays, which meant that TSN became the Canadian destination for
Major league Baseball. Third, and perhaps most noteworthy, due to its nature as an
all-sports service, TSN was able to offer blanket or “bulk” coverage of sporting events
that conventional broadcasters could not. That is, TSN could provide coverage of
entire tournaments or events uninterrupted and free from regularly scheduled pro-
gramming (see Killingsworth, 1999). This bulk coverage offered guaranteed exposure
for sporting events, which in turn enticed other leagues and event organizers to side
with TSN rather than any of the other “big three” Canadian conventional broadcast-
ers (Global, CTV, and CBC). These three factors rewarded TSN with more than encour-
aging financial success. 
From 2001 to 2002, wTSN broadcast an array of news, documentary, instruc-
tional, educational/recreational, professional/amateur, and film programming. The
network covered major professional sports such as lPGA (ladies Professional Golf
Association) golf, wNBA (women’s National Basketball Association) basketball, and
wTA (women’s Tennis Association) tennis. Soccer, curling, swimming, figure skating,
and beach volleyball, among others, were also popular sports included in the net-
work’s programming. wTSN was also an official broadcaster of the CIS (Canadian
Intercollegiate Sport) basketball, volleyball, and hockey championships—Canadian
content but not the type that garners high ratings. These sports, while representing
a variety of female athletic endeavour and interest, were not easy to broadcast because
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in many cases they were not produced and ready for purchase. This created a signifi-
cant cost burden. As one respondent explained, “Sports [are] very expensive to cover,
especially … live. It’s one thing to maybe make a talk show or a documentary program
or whatever, or programs designed to fit the demographic. But to mount live sports
coverage of women’s events … that’s expensive” (Respondent 9, male host/reporter).
Even though wTSN was able to purchase programming feeds for certain events, it still
incurred the high cost of producing original programming and purchasing broadcast-
ing rights for women’s sporting events (Houston, 2003; Zelkovich, 2003). In addition,
programming that could be harvested from wTSN’s existing synergies with brother
network TSN and the CTV Television Network was limited to 10% per week (CRTC,
2000b).
To further complicate matters and hamstring the network, 30% of its program-
ming had to be devoted to Canadian content from 6:00 a.m. to midnight (the entire
broadcasting day—18 hours) and from 6:00 p.m. to midnight (prime time—6 hours)
daily (CRTC, 2000c). Conceivably, wTSN might have been less burdened in fulfilling
the 30% rule in the daytime but likely faced significant challenges in offering 30%
Canadian content in the lucrative prime-time period, when competition for audiences
would be higher. In comparison, wTSN’s sport diginet counterparts arguably had
deeper and cheaper sources of sports programming to draw from to operate their serv-
ices and no Cancon requirements. For instance, the NHl Network, principally owned
by the National Hockey league (NHl), could access programming without cost via
ownership synergies. Raptors NBA TV and leafs TV were in the same position, being
predominantly owned by their respective sport team franchises. ESPN Classic Canada
had the advantage of airing programs already purchased by ESPN and TSN, and Fox
Sport world Canada featured pre-taped rugby, soccer, and cricket matches (see
Houston, 2003). As noted by one interviewee:
you know, TSN had ESPN Classic—these are the cheapest [channels] you
could run. you know? I mean really. you pay next to nothing for rights; you
bring in some people to talk in the studio for a while. I mean, this is almost
a guaranteed winner. (Respondent 4, male reporter)
Eventually, not being able to access cheap programming affected the quality of
wTSN’s broadcasting. The high cost of producing most of its original content took a
heavy toll on other aspects of the network’s “unique approach” to women’s sports
programming. As early as October 2001, barely a month after its launch, the network
gutted production of WTSN Connects, a flagship show that had started out as a two-
hour-long weekend news program hosted by Norma wick. Soon after the program’s
launch wTSN released two employees and reduced the show from an in-depth look
into the world of women’s sports to a  30-minute news spot (Zelkovich, 2001). By
April 2002, the show and another flagship program, Fight to the Finish, were cancelled
altogether. Not long after, both Norma wick and Jennifer Hedger, host of Fight to the
Finish, were released by the network (Zerbisias, 2002).
WTSN, the female audience, and making the apolitical political
Examining TSN’s envisioned audience is useful to understand the logic underlying
38 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 35 (1)
wTSN’s envisioned audience. In TSN’s original licence application, it was initially pro-
posed that a broad spectrum of men and women of “all age groups” would be tar-
geted (Sparks, 1992, p. 333). later on in the licence application, however, the criteria
were expressed differently, proposing to appeal to a “dedicated sports fan.” As Sparks
(1992, p. 334) notes, this was problematic because “[t]his conception of the viewer-as-
dedicated-sports-fan conflicted with the notion of ‘men and women of all age groups’
already cited, and corresponded more closely to the composition of network sports
audiences which traditionally were male.” Regardless of this discrepancy, TSN went on
to successfully use the idea of the “dedicated sports fan” to sell its image and secure
itself as a powerful brand for consumers interested in all-sports programming. 
wTSN’s intended audience as proposed in its network application was less
ambiguous than TSN’s. wTSN said it would produce programming
showcasing all aspects of women’s sports and sports of interest to women …
[and would] focus on women in the sporting world and their fans … [and]
develop meaningful and proactive sports oriented programs for women: all
produced with and for women, addressing topics and issues that are timely
and relevant. (TSN, 2000, p. 4)
This excerpt explicitly identifies women as wTSN’s intended audience. The intention
to cover “all aspects of women’s sports and sports of interest to women” retrospec-
tively was considered highly problematic by all interviewees. On the one hand, most
observed that, with the exception of the Olympics, “all aspects of women’s sports”
was not a viable basis for a sports network because mainstream television sports pro-
gramming had rarely featured all-women’s events on a consistent basis. On the other
hand, according to respondents, “sports of interest to women,” such as figure skating
or other Olympics event programming that has previously attracted large female audi-
ences, could not adequately support an all-sport format service, since they are stand-
alone events rather than sports that have lengthy seasons complementing routine
sports broadcasting practices. 
Overwhelmingly, in addition to the poor implementation of digital technology roll-
out that was identified as a great disadvantage to wTSN and other diginets, the most
pervasive theme to emerge over the course of interviews was that the predominant
female audience was the most damaging criterion on which the network was based:
[S]o when you come out and you try to push something on a female audi-
ence, the audience is not there first of all because traditionally women are
not [television] sports watchers. But they are now the sporting audience, they
are becoming fans and you’re gonna see them at games. But they’re not nec-
essarily fitting the package to watch wTSN. (Respondent 7, female commen-
tator)
Many women watch sports to spend time with their husband or boyfriend or
whatever. So unless women themselves tuned to it, it wasn’t gonna get the
viewership. [T]imes may have changed more than I think but I still don’t
think there are all that many women out there  … a giant chunk of the
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[female] population that turns to sports first when they turn on the TV.
(Respondent 5, male reporter)
These views contrast markedly with the rationalization for wTSN as outlined in its
licence application. Specifically, the application slightly departed from not only envi-
sioning women as its intended viewers but made further distinctions when it high-
lighted “women as fans,” and bringing its proposed “women’s perspective” to
broadcasting. The following statements represent the most ideological sentiments in
the network’s licence application:
Until now, there has been no broadcasting service whose sole focus is achiev-
ing the growth, popularity and acceptance of women’s sports, women athletes
and women as fans … The wSN concept is entirely original. Our emphasis on
sports of interest to women and women’s perspective on sports will contribute
to the goals of developing positive role models for women and youth, devel-
oping female Canadian athletes and developing their sports. Sports on televi-
sion tends to be programmed for men and the programming itself
emphasizes men’s sports by a very significant margin. There can be little
doubt that Canadian women’s sports is [sic] underrepresented on Canadian
television … The uniqueness of women’s roles, goals and needs in sports is
rarely if ever addressed on television … wSN will showcase the diversity and
uniqueness of women’s sports and women athletes in a way that is just not
being done today. (TSN, 2000, p. 5)4
These statements convey the outlook that wTSN would not be a commonplace addi-
tion to specialty sport television. They also explicitly exude a political critique of the
under-representation of women’s sports on television—one that is firmly entrenched
in liberal feminist sentiments of gender equality and the reclamation of media space
and production practices. The interviewees did not regard this to be a  fruitful
approach. Explicitly targeting an audience in this manner was regarded as being too
aggressively political and consequently counter-productive to the goals of attracting
an audience and legitimizing women’s sport within television sport culture.
The claims made in the application statements cited above illustrated awareness
of long-standing gender inequality (the problem) and the potential value, if granted
licence approval, of wTSN (the solution). For respondents, politicizing wTSN would
not lure a viable female audience to watch women’s sports. The following intervie-
wees’ remarks addressed this concern:
There was a show years ago, called women in Sport. First of all, I don’t like that
title … It comes off [as] carrying the torch. women in Sport, it turns people off
… The women’s branding I think actually hurts. Because what you end up
doing is you end up sort of creating this little niche for it. But you don’t need
to. you need people watching. you just need eyeballs. [They were] saying,
“This station is really only for women.” And it shouldn’t have been. It should
have just been about female sport. (Respondent  7, female commentator)
Just having ovaries doesn’t make every woman exactly the same as every
other woman. I hope I’m not saying anything out of line but … barring the
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intensely, intensely militant feminist, who will say, “we are only going to
watch only because it’s women … and because we are gonna support women
regardless of what’s on there,” the reality is, that you can’t sort of just corral
women like a bunch of cattle out in the wilderness somewhere and say,
“Here’s the women’s show, you guys watch the women’s show,” while all the
guys go and watch their stuff. That’s not realistic. women have brains and
interests and everything else just like men do. (Respondent 5, male reporter)
you just can’t sort of say they’re just going to rush off to support a cause—
that’s not how it works. women will watch if they are interested. But it won’t
be just because [they’re] going to do it for the cause. They’re not going to
watch it for that reason. I think it is complex. But I know you can’t assume
that they’re watching with a sense of solidarity. (Respondent  9, male
host/reporter)
Another statement from the license application claimed that wTSN would attract
a previously untapped “audience mix” that would appeal to different types of adver-
tisers (TSN, 2000, p. 5). while this excerpt identified an “audience mix,” it was clear
that women would be the primary demographic and they would be a desirable demo-
graphic for advertisers of women’s health products, sporting apparel, and cosmetics—
products that have not traditionally supported the production of television sports
programming.
The target audience for wTSN was considerably less ambiguously defined than
that of TSN. Paradoxically, however, the interviewees articulated clearly that this
approach was ultimately a weakness. The perception that wTSN was rationalized on
the basis of political arguments about gender inequity in sport television was viewed
as one reason why the network found it difficult to establish an audience. In this
regard, politicizing women’s sports was perceived to have precipitated the downfall of
wTSN because women, according to above interviewees’ accounts, were not necessar-
ily apt to be persuaded to watch sports just because women were the participants.
later—and ironically, because women were the intended audience for the network—
they were not only blamed for its downfall but also in some ways chastised by some
respondents for not demonstrating wilful and collective political agency by watching
wTSN en masse. The following remarks exemplify this politically charged double-
edged sword:
None of my friends were watching. Very few of my friends were subscribing.
They are big sports women. They are fans, they are athletes; some of them
are high-performance athletes. They weren’t subscribing and they weren’t
watching. Regardless of my social campaigning at the outset saying, “listen
girls … you better sign on; we all have to support this.” … I was saying, “you
know, girls … come on. you gotta subscribe to this. Do your part. Because if
we don’t support this and it fails … it’s going to be a long time before some-
one tries again.” (Respondent 2, female commentator)
My feeling is the women were at fault for letting that go down the toilet… .
[l]et’s face it, there are a lot of women out there in major positions of author-
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ity for revenue. If they wanted it, here was their chance to keep it going. Now
there is absolutely no excuse in the world for them to say, “There’s nothing
for us.” (Respondent 3, male host/reporter)
In the red: WTSN’s financial record
As noted above, TSN’s 1989 move from individual pay service to the discretionary tier
created a stable foundation upon which to cultivate its future market. After being pack-
aged with other specialty channels and sold as the first tier to consumers, TSN was able
to collect both advertising and cable subscription revenues (Sparks, 1992). when com-
pared to pay-per-view services that relied on advertising revenue alone, having these
two revenue streams put TSN at an advantage in terms of attracting sufficient capital
required to run a profitable 24-hour sports service. when asked about the importance
of having two secure revenue streams (cable subscriber and advertising), then network
president Rick Brace remarked: “you couldn’t run the service if you run on advertising
alone […] you’d be out of business” (quoted in Killingsworth, 1999, p. 47). This obser-
vation ironically foreshadowed the conditions under which wTSN subsequently
launched as a digital television service. Its major revenue sources were digital television
service subscriptions and advertising. Table 1 below sheds more light on the glaring dis-
parity between wTSN’s revenues and expenses from 2002-2003.
The numbers
In 2000, the Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA) estimated that there were
500,000 potential digital cable customers in Canada. By March 2002 Decima Publishing
reported that there were 2.9  million digital subscribers (Anonymous, 2002). These
numbers raise concerns regarding wTSN’s ability to exist as a service without access to
substantial digital television subscriber revenue. The network relied heavily on both
digital television subscriber and advertising revenue to make a profit. This, coupled
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Table 1: WTSN and category 2 sport diginet financial data, 2002-2003
WTSN
ESPN Classic
Canada Canada
NHL
Network
Raptors
NBA TV
2002
Total Revenue 693,856 601,837 1,363,985 1,463,164
Total Expenses 3,132,181 2,146,602 4,876,603 5,057,693
Number of
Subscribers
317,866 318,108 328,930 318,000
2003
Total Revenue 1,422,387 1,436,920 3,305,938 2,720,042
Total Expenses 4,595,625 3,703,775 6,648,278 5,116,670
Number of
Subscribers 426,743 434,583 446,105 408,967
Source: CRTC, 2004, Individual pay and specialty services: 
Statistical and financial summaries (pp. 44, 46, 54, and 63).
with only 317,866 customers subscribing to its service in year one, makes it reasonable
to assume that unless the network’s advertising revenues were significantly high, it did
not have much chance to at least break even. Figures filed with the CRTC show that
wTSN’s total revenue in its inaugural broadcast year was $693,856, while expenses
totalled $3,132,181 (CRTC, 2004). wTSN’s sport diginet contemporaries like ESPN
Classic Canada, the NHl Network, and Raptors NBA TV had comparable financial data,
but what separated these stations was that they were category 2 licensees and, on aver-
age, their revenues exceeded those of wTSN in 2003 (see Table 1).
Their greater revenues provide some evidence of these channels being successful
in attracting more subscribers and advertising revenue than wTSN. Interviewees also
speculated that because their category 2 status liberated them from the strict Cancon
restrictions of category 1 stations like wTSN, these stations were not in jeopardy of
ceasing operations, even though they did not have promising subscription numbers.
After only one month of operation
wTSN had not attracted strong rat-
ings. In October  2001, the channel
registered 600 per minute audience
in prime time, a rank of 34 out of 50
digital channels (Zelkovich, 2001)
(and see Table 2).
when reflecting on this period
of time, interviewees speculated that
perhaps wTSN was never really
expected to be profitable. They also
cited a combination of factors to
explain the poor ratings: poor pro-
gramming quality, a lack of diverse
content, and that wTSN was not
afforded enough time to iron out the
“kinks” associated with digital roll-
out. One respondent remarked that
no digital network would heavily
invest in programming estimated to reach less than 2% of the audience unless it were
“a pet project” where losses could be completely written off (Respondent 11, female
reporter). The following comment also expresses this judgment:
[I]t must have been a pretty big risk. However, there are also political work-
ings in place that we don’t know about. Another thing that was expressed to
me was the budget that they had was not good. So, your hands are tied with
what you can show, with how much people you can hire. I’m not trying to
have any conspiracy theory [but] it was almost set up to fail. (Respondent 12,
female host/anchor)
Discussion and conclusion
From its very inception, wTSN faced an uncertain future. As a digital service it had
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Table 2: 
Diginet ratings per minute, October 2001
Channel
Ratings
Per Min.
Rank/50
Diginets
ESPN Classic 2,200 13
X-Treme
Sports
1,600 19
Fox Sports
World Canada
800 31
WTSN 600 34
Leafs TV 200 37
Raptors 
NBA TV
200 37
Source: Zelkovich, 2001
a limited audience pool from which to draw, which led to difficulties attracting adver-
tisers. To compensate for its limited audience reach, wTSN had to create services that
would: a) lure established audiences away from existing analogue conventional
broadcasters and specialty channels; and/or b) cultivate a completely different audi-
ence with unique programming. As discussed above, wTSN made a bold attempt to
do the latter. Due to the nature of category 1 digital television licences, this option was
reasonable given the uniqueness of its intended programming. The anticipated audi-
ence, however, did not materialize, leading to the question of why its owners did not
instead apply for a category 2 licence. If the overarching motive of the CRTC was to
“maximize the production and exhibition of new Canadian programming” (CRTC
2000b), the demise of networks like wTSN has demonstrated that the laissez-faire
market approach to television broadcasting that may have been of extreme benefit to
TSN and MuchMusic some 25 years ago has turned into a liability for many new digi-
tal services. Put another way, when given the choice of purchasing digital services on
a per channel basis, between the arrival and demise of wTSN, Canadian consumers
did not support the new technology in sufficient numbers to make most channels
financially viable. 
The ideological dimension cannot be understated as a contributing factor in
wTSN’s demise. By design, wTSN may have attempted to attract an audience that per-
haps was not even aware of the channel’s existence or wholly convinced to subscribe.
The proposed predominant female audience may have been a larger threat to the
channel’s success than the digital platform on which it was delivered. For that reason,
any logic in cultivating a female audience would be rendered illogical because of the
impracticality of delivering such a demographic for television sports to advertisers.
The network’s licence application claimed that wTSN would fill a gender void in tele-
vision sports programming. For the most part, these claims were based on many lib-
eral feminist objectives of gender equality. Although little evidence supported wTSN’s
self-proclaimed identity as a feminist venture, it is safe to say that the network did
appropriate many feminist codes in its creation and eventual programming produc-
tion. This appropriation may have been unavoidable based on the fact that the CRTC’s
own impetus for introducing digital television was itself ideologically entrenched. The
cultural imperative of advancing and enhancing diversity through commercial televi-
sion representation, while aptly noble, placed wTSN’s for-profit orientation at a clear
disadvantage. This of course raises the issue of whether cultural interests or those that
address democratic ideals are best represented by for-profit enterprises at all. Scholars
have argued that the relationship between cultural interests and for-profit media has
tended to be toxic at best (see Jhally, 1987; Rowe, 1996; Sauvageau, 2006; Taras, 2006).
Moreover, this relationship must be revised and reconsidered in the modern era of
audience interactivity and the ongoing migration from traditional media forms to
those embracing digitization. 
The question that remains is how to reconcile cultural interests, which also may
well be decidedly feminist ones, with the economically driven philosophies of audi-
ence commodities. If the purpose of media cultural policies (à la the CRTC) is to hon-
estly address Canadians as citizens who uphold and desire the merits of equity in
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representation and access to a diversity of television genres, then the traditional logic
of the audience needs to be revised. This would obviously involve a considerable par-
adigm shift, as the socio-cultural value and rewards gained in representing periphery
or marginal groups would have to be regarded as just as appropriate and serious as
the economic ones. If, however, the intent of such cultural policies is to address
Canadians as consumers, then outcomes like that experienced by wTSN will persist
as consumer choice and “bottom line” interests of private broadcasters will trump all
else. Currently (and paradoxically), the cultural directives underpinning policies that
are intended to foster diversity by granting exposure to underserved genres and
groups are executed by a private sector with little interest in these goals. Adjudicators
of potential television licensees that propose similar services in the future will
undoubtedly cite wTSN as evidence of economic failure and question the merits of
trying again. Implicitly and explicitly, however, such perspectives will inevitably be
based on the premise that cultural interests should answer to the pressures of the eco-
nomic imperative. This, of course, does not bode well for truly addressing new seg-
ments of the audience that desire options not available in the mainstream television
landscape.
A final ideological factor that was not formally recognized by those interviewed
was that of the economic imperative. Respondents were well aware of the necessary
requirements for sport to be “successful” on television. That is, they consistently cited
the commercial market logic of profit-making as a practice that exists, almost alone
and without any input or influence from outside agents. The profit-making philoso-
phy as the ultimate marker of success for the television-sport marriage was not exam-
ined with the same level of criticism as the decision to launch wTSN as an exclusive
women’s sport network. In other words, the ideological dimension of the economic
imperative was not wholly problematized by the respondents interviewed. This was
curious in light of the fact that some respondents deemed women’s sports, even pro-
fessional women’s sports, best suited for the same level of television attention as ama-
teur sports—public broadcasting. Although the economic imperative was held up as
a common explanatory frame for the demise of wTSN, the gendered politics of media
sport, consistently and, at times, uncritically identified during the interviewing
process, also led to the demise of a network purportedly fashioned to attract a predom-
inantly female audience. Further, there was little distinction between how female and
male interviewees responded to the typical gender politics of the broader social world.
while many acknowledged that societal gender inequality still presented challenges
for female athletes in the sport realm, male sport was held up as the cultural standard
of television sports programming and was both implicitly and explicitly linked to the
definition of “real” sport. In turn, what was largely problematized was not the current,
common-sense model of male-centred sports programming but female sports, and
female audiences for sports altogether. Ultimately, the opportunity to broadcast radi-
cal representations of women’s sport will exist, but economic imperatives will undeni-
ably do more to stifle these innovative attempts than promote them.
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Notes
1. Observers have argued that the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, attracted
many audiences to cable and analogue cable news services, resulting in a  spike in ratings at the
expense of other types of television services.
2. These six men and six women (referred to as both interviewees and respondents in the article) rep-
resent a range of print and television commentators, print and television reporters, and television and
radio hosts and anchors. Semi-structured interviews were based on conversations about the history of
television sports broadcasting in Canada, popular television sports, knowledge of digital television,
women’s sport, and wTSN. This list of subject matter is not exhaustive. The mean duration of each
interview was approximately 90 minutes.
3. These stakeholders included industry groups (e.g., the Canadian Association of Broadcasters and
Canadian Cable Television Association); think tanks and lobbyists (e.g., Communications Research
Centre Canada); and members representing the public and private broadcasting sectors (e.g., the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Canwest Global).
4. In its original licence application, wTSN is referred to as “wSN.”
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